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Abstract
The focus in human reliability analysis of nuclear power plants has traditionally 
been on human performance in disturbance conditions. On the other hand, human 
maintenance failures and design deﬁciencies, remained latent in the system, have 
an impact on the severity of a disturbance, e.g. by disabling safety-related equip-
ment on demand. Especially common cause failures (CCFs) of safety related sys-
tems can affect the core damage risk to a signiﬁcant extent. The topic has been 
addressed in Finnish studies, where experiences of latent human errors have been 
searched and analysed systematically from the maintenance history stored in 
the the power plant information systems of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs.
Both the single and multiple errors (CCFs) were classiﬁed in detail and docu-
mented as error and event reports. The human CCFs involved human, organisa-
tional and technical factors. The review of the analysed single and multiple errors 
showed that instrumentation & control and electrical equipment are more prone 
to human error caused failure events than the other maintenance objects.
The review of the analysed experience showed that most errors stem from the refu-
elling and maintenance outage periods. More than half of the multiple errors from 
the outages remained latent to the power operating periods. The review of the ana-
lysed multiple errors showed that difﬁculties with small plant modiﬁcations and plan-
ning of maintenance and operability were signiﬁcant sources of common cause fail-
ures. The most dependent human errors originating from small modiﬁcations could 
be reduced by a more tailored planning and coverage of their start-up testing pro-
grams. Improvements could also be achieved by identiﬁying better in work plan-
ning from the operating experiences those complex or intrusive repair and preven-
tive maintenance work tasks and actions which are prone to errors. Such uncertain 
cases in important equipment require a more tailored work planning of the instal-
lation inspections and functional testing. Such a planning case shall include a need 
evaluation of both the component and system level testing at the end of work.
In addition, the use of condition monitoring information helps in reducing the 
uncertainty about equipment operability after intrusive maintenance or modiﬁca-
tions. An increased use of condition information for a situation speciﬁc steering 
of preventive maintenance actions could also help to avoid unnecessary predeter-
mined preventive maintenance actions which have the potential to cause unneces-
sary failures. A more agile adjustment of work orders to correspond the new condi-
tions identiﬁed by maintenance personnel locally during work was also found nec-
essary to reduce human CCFs caused by e.g. missing testing or inspections.
LAAKSO Kari (VTT Industrial Systems). Systematic analysis and prevention of human originated 
common cause failures in relation to maintenance activities at Finnish nuclear power plants.  
STUK-YTO-TR 217. Helsinki 2006. 33 pp.
Keywords: maintenance, operability, human failures, common cause failures, testing, inspections, 
experience feedback, statistics, nuclear power plants 
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The results emphasize the responsibility and requirements of versatility and spe-
cialisation of the planning and performance of maintenance and operability veri-
ﬁcation which brings this work to a knowledge work. For instance, ﬂexibility is 
needed for the adaptation to speciﬁc conditions of the equipment and work as 
well as adhering to the rules and procedures is required. And mostly both a spe-
cialist knowledge of the equipment and a functional overview of the system are 
required. The event and error analyses of the multiple and single errors would help 
in training the maintenance, operation and technical personnel to identify bet-
ter error mechanisms and prevent undetected human CCFs and errors, too.
An earlier and better deﬁned examination of the CCF risks as a part of the failure 
reporting and repair and modiﬁcation processes would also help to identify, investigate 
and prevent CCFs. Generally, operability veriﬁcation of the work objects in plant equip-
ment should be planned and implemented better as an integral part of the plant main-
tenance process requiring knowledge of both the maintenance and operation branches.
Methods for analysis of maintenance history information, examples of pres-
entation of analysis results and further conclusions and recommenda-
tions for identiﬁcation and prevention of latent human common cause fail-
ures, single errors and costly rework are also described in this report.
STUK- YTO-TR 217
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1 Introduction
The focus in human reliability analysis of nuclear 
power plants has traditionally been on control room 
operator performance in disturbance conditions. In 
the area of maintenance activities, the emphasis has 
been on human reliability of non-destructive inspec-
tions. On the other hand, incidents have shown that 
errors related to maintenance and testing, which 
have taken place earlier in plant history, may have 
an impact on the severity of a disturbance, e.g. by 
disabling safety related equipment.
The human failures have often been complex 
event sequences, involving human, organisational 
and technical factors. Especially common cause and 
other dependent failures of safety systems may sig-
niﬁcantly contribute to the reactor core damage risk 
[Laakso, Pyy & Reiman, 1998]. The topic has been 
addressed in the Finnish studies of human common 
cause failures, where experiences on latent multiple 
and single human errors have been searched and 
analysed in detail from the maintenance history.
In the Finnish projects, one aim was also to 
promote the studies of human factors related to 
maintenance [Oedewald & Reiman 2003]. Another 
aim of the analysis was to support PSA by extend-
ing the applicability of human reliability analysis 
to study of the effects of wrong human actions in 
relation to maintenance [Pyy 2000] and by plant 
speciﬁc CCF data.
The main aim of the projects was identiﬁcation, 
description and prevention of human originated 
CCFs and single errors in relation to maintenance 
by analysis, remedial actions and learning.
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2 The scope of the studies
Case studies for identiﬁcation and analysis of hu-
man common cause failures from the maintenance 
history in plant information systems have been 
conducted for the nuclear power plants Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto. Apart from the safety systems, the stud-
ies covered all steam and power generating systems 
of the plant units also. All plant systems were cov-
ered due to the fact that human error mechanisms 
may be similar at the different parts of the plant. 
Besides, all from the risk point of view signiﬁcant 
systems are not classiﬁed as safety systems. Thus, 
a more extensive database of multiple error mecha-
nisms was obtained for learning to prevent the 
signiﬁcant human common cause failures.
The analysis of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 three- 
year experience during 1992–1994 covered 4400 
fault repair work orders. Totally 334 human error 
cases were identiﬁed and among them the number 
of single errors was 206. The number of dependent 
human common cause failure event cases derived 
and analysed was 14 [Laakso, Pyy & Reiman, 1998]. 
In the corresponding study of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant units 1 and 2 maintenance history 
during 1995–1997, the number of fault repair work 
orders was 14091.The number of single errors iden-
tiﬁed was 149 and of human common cause failure 
cases identiﬁed and analysed was 34 [Laakso & 
Saarelainen, 2003].
The numbers from the different plant sites are 
not directly comparable. In the Olkiluoto case all the 
4400 fault repair work orders were studied. But the 
scope of the examined work orders was limited in 
the Loviisa plant case by creating a data screening 
procedure. The screening procedure had a hit rate 
of 2/3 in error identiﬁcation in the detailed analysis 
of the studied fault work orders.
The studies also covered analysis of the weak-
nesses in the barriers aimed to reveal or prevent 
human originated common cause failures in relation 
to maintenance activities [Laakso, 2004].
STUK- YTO-TR 217
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3 Analysis methods of single 
and multiple errors
Introduction to terms. In order to enable a bet-
ter understanding of the analysis results and the 
report, important failure and error related terms 
used in this study are ﬁrstly deﬁned in Table I.
The power plant information systems. The 
power plant information systems in Finnish NPPs 
include work planning and fault, maintenance and 
operation place histories. The experience data is 
well documented and has a good coverage from the 
80´s. The documentation and classiﬁcation of the 
fault and repair history information is performed 
by the maintenance and operation personnel. Most 
Table I. Deﬁnition of central terms. 
Failure is the termination of the ability of an item to perform the required function. Failure is an 
event, as distinguished from “fault” which means a failed state [see e.g. EN 13306 1999]. The faulty 
item deviates from the wished standard of performance in its failed state or from the required function 
in its end state. If you do not wish to divide the used failure term into fault, failure or failure situation, 
“failure” can be used as a general term.
Human error. A human unintended or intended action that produces an unintended result. An omit-
ted or erroneous action may trigger directly, or initiate a failure process leading to, a failed state or 
a failed end state of the equipment. E.g., omission of on-line return of equipment after maintenance 
work causes a failure of equipment to perform its function. Or, instrument pipelines may be crosswise 
connected during a modiﬁcation or an intrusive maintenance action, due to deﬁcient documentation or 
lacking knowledge, causing a failure of the pressure difference trip to operate. In some sources, human 
errors are divided into slips, lapses, mistakes, violations, omissions and commissions [see e.g. Swain & 
Guttman 1983, Reason 1990]. In this study, human failures are studied more from the technical point 
of view, what are the direct effects of errors on equipment and their function, and which are the root 
causes of the multiple errors.
Common cause failure. Common cause failures (CCF) are similar failure causes or mechanisms, 
that may apparently result or have resulted simultaneously in multiple functionally critical failures in 
redundant subsystems in real demand situations. Also as CCFs are deﬁned multiple failures acting on 
parallel trains or circuits, if they are unable to fulﬁl correctly their required function. Multiple erroneous 
or omitted actions are triggers to human originated common cause failures.
Common cause non-critical failure. Common cause non-critical failures (CCNs) are similar failure 
mechanisms which result simultaneously into deviations from wished standard of performance of 
redundant or parallel equipment. They include defects on items which are not critical for the equipment 
function. The failures originating from outages are deﬁned as non-critical, if the failures were detected 
and repaired before transfer to the plant operating states where the operability of equipment is required. 
Generally, if the deviations are getting worse, these precursors can develop into common cause failures. 
The CCNs can be regarded as an early warning of causes or mechanisms otherwise leading to CCFs.
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of the plant personnel use the plant information 
system.
Failure cause and entry coding used in the 
work order reporting. The original cause coding 
used by the plant personnel in the failure and repair 
work orders in the Loviisa power plant information 
system is shown as an example in Table II.
The above cause classiﬁcation coding of Loviisa 
NPP is also rather similar with the corresponding 
coding at the Olkiluoto plant. The cause coding 
together with study of written descriptions in the 
failure and repair work orders helps to identify 
candidates of human errors related to maintenance 
activities from the failure and maintenance his-
tory.
Screening of human error candidates from 
plant failure reporting. One speciﬁc and useful 
feature in the maintenance history reporting in 
one of the plants, the Loviisa plant, was the clas-
siﬁcation of the probable entry of the failure, see 
Table III. The following classiﬁcation coding (espe-
cially 12 = during previous maintenance or repair) 
of the plant reporting helped to identify a subset of 
those failure and repair work orders which originate 
from previous maintenance actions or repairs.
In a detailed review of the failure repair work 
orders classiﬁed like so, a number of maintenance 
and modiﬁcation related errors could be retrieved. 
The ﬁrst screening of the error candidates from a 
very large number of work orders was performed by 
comparing the written descriptions on symptoms, 
causes and actions with the given cause classiﬁca-
tion codes (in Table II) of the work orders.Almost 
all identiﬁed single and multiple human failures 
were cause classiﬁed to originate from installation, 
wrong setting, maintenance or repair error, or hu-
man error. Then all the failure and repair reports 
belonging to these four cause coding classes, plus 
the work orders coded as probably introduced dur-
ing previous maintenance or repair, were selected as 
candidates for further study. The screening criteria 
of the work orders for the complete study were veri-
ﬁed by reviewing the sample human errors with the 
proposed screening criteria in expert sessions with 
the plant maintenance planners and regulatory 
body professionals.
Analysis and classiﬁcation of human er-
rors. Within the Olkiluoto plant case study detailed 
classiﬁcation models for human errors in relation 
to maintenance were developed and used. The 
information from the maintenance work order 
database was utilised for analysis of the errors. In 
the later Loviisa plant study the error classiﬁcation 
was enhanced to individualize better the quality 
errors related to maintenance, too. The idea at the 
Loviisa plant study was also to identify and verify 
the time and nature of the error origin in a more 
detailed way than in the earlier Olkiluoto case. The 
advancements of the classiﬁcation of the mainte-
nance related human errors have been applied only 
for the Loviisa plant. The used error classiﬁcation 
Table II. Cause coding of failures used in the plant work order system.
A Equipment and design
AA Design
AB Material
AC Manufacturing
AD Installation
C Consequence of operation
CA Exceeding a limit value
CB Over-stressing
CC Blockage, sediment, stagnation
CD Foreign objects
CE Normal wear of lifetime
CG Break, connection fault
B Personnel
BA Control or operational error
BB Wrong setting or control
BC Maintenance or repair error
BD Lack of or delayed action
BE  Human error
D Miscellaneous causes
DA Cascade failure
DB External cause
DC Deﬁcient work order or instruction 
Z Other (give extra description)
Table III. Coding of probable failure entry into equip-
ment.
– Undeﬁned
01 Before previous test
02 Before previous maintenance or repair
11 During previous test
12 During previous maintenance or repair
13 During previous operation
21 After previous test
22 After previous maintenance or repair
23 After previous operation
31 Immediately before detection
32 After previous shift walk-around
STUK- YTO-TR 217
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in Table IV structures and describes how the direct 
effects of human errors in relation to maintenance 
appear on the equipment level.
In the detailed analysis of all human errors 
related to maintenance, including both the single 
and the multiple errors, were classiﬁed according 
to following explaining factors:
• Equipment type inﬂuenced by error,
• how the failure was detected,
• plant operating state at failure detection,
• direct error effects (see Table IV),
• erroneous task triggering the failure failure 
process or event,
• time instant and plant state when error oc-
curred,
• whether the error was single or multiple.
In Table V, an example of an analysis of a human 
error in relation to maintenance is presented.
In the ﬁrst column of the table, the equipment 
place is deﬁned as a functional item at a level 
where an identiﬁcation number and labelling such 
as 10RC51N001 (an ejector) or 10RC51 T001 (a 
temperature measurement) can be identiﬁed in the 
plant [TUD 94].
The identiﬁcation of the erroneous work task 
as the “failure trigger” and its time instant was a 
demanding task for the analysis. The erroneous 
task was searched by scrolling through the preced-
ing work history of the failed equipment place or its 
train from the plant information system. The identi-
ﬁcation of the erroneous task required maintenance 
experience and technical knowledge of equipment, 
Errors of Omission (missing human action)
1. Restoration errors of operability after work, such as omission of the realignment of process or instru-
ment valves, disconnectors, breakers, fuses or limit settings. Omission of reﬁlling of ﬂuid or gas into 
lines, tanks or drainings
2. Disconnected cables or electronic or mechanical components not reconnected during work . Omission 
to install packing or adjusting device.Settings, adjustments, preventive maintenance or inspections 
omitted.
3. Foreign objects or impurities left behind inside the object of the work. Examples are dirt, garbage, 
metal shives, tools, scaffolds or covering material.
Errors of Commission (wrong human action)
Wrong order or direction
4. Wrong order, such as cables or instrument pipelines crosswise connected. 
5. Wrong direction, such as reversed or twisted installation of valve or another sub-component. Wrong 
positioning of valve. 
Wrong selection
6. Wrong place or object, such as cabling ﬁxed on wrong connection, setting of wrong tripping conditions 
or draining of wrong pipeline. Item installed on wrong equipment place. 
7. Wrong or mixed spare parts, parts, materials, tools, ﬂuids or chemicals selected for work. 
Wrong settings/adjustments/calibrations
8. Wrong settings of trip limits, limit switches, reference, indication or time delay values, or of adjusting 
devices. Deﬁcient alignment of shaft, stem/spindle or pipe. Wrong setting of pipe support or pack-
ing.
Other quality problems
9. Too little force, e.g. loose connections of bolts, nuts, bonnets, cables or sensors
10. Too much force, e.g. excessive tightening or greasing
11. Damaging other equipment e.g. cabling, cable trays or small diameter piping by falling material or 
slugging/contacting. Can be due to carelessness and narrow spaces for work or transport.
12. Other carelessness (if 1–11 are not applicable). E.g. worn tools, falling material, deﬁcient weld, 
solder joint or insulation. Unclear trips initiated during testing, installation or maintenance. Wrong 
subtitling or recording. Wrong timing. 
Table IV. Classiﬁcation of direct errors on equipment.
12
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and in some obscure cases expert judgements were 
needed to extract the probable task.
Analysis and classiﬁcation of root causes 
of multiple failures. Apart from the observable 
effects of all errors on equipment, the underlying 
contributing factors are analysed and classiﬁed for 
the dependent human errors. The root causes and 
cause descriptions of the multiple errors (HCCF/
HCCNs) could be assigned to one of the following 
groups (Table VI).
Table V. An example of a basic analysis of a human error in relation to maintenance.
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10RC51 
 T001 &
T002
220691A 28.09.95 Temperature 
measurements 
10RC51T001 and T002 
after the ejectors 
10RC51N001 and 
10RC51N003 indicated 
too much  because 
measurements had 
been crosswise 
connected in repair.
AD IC 9 OPER 4 REPAIR, 
16.04.1993, 
OPER
Yes.
1HCCN 
RC51.
The principles followed in the division of errors 
into single ones, HCCFs (human common cause 
failures), HCCNs (human non-critical common 
cause failures), HSEFs (human shared equipment 
failures) and OFD (other dependent failures) are 
presented in Table VII.
Event reports on human common cause 
failures. In addition to the basic analysis and clas-
siﬁcation of the single human errors, the human 
CCFs were analysed and classiﬁed also with respect 
1. Maintenance and operability planning deﬁciency:  
Incorrect, incomplete or unclear planning of maintenance or operability veriﬁcation actions such 
as maintenance, repair, installation inspection or functional testing phases of work. Deﬁciencies in 
coverage of start-up tests or installation inspections of modi ﬁcations. Deﬁciencies in coverage of 
maintenance or inspection program. Deﬁciencies in deﬁnition or decision of work scope , work order, 
operation order or procedure.
2. Design deﬁciency:  
Error or deﬁciency in design or documentation of modiﬁcation, equipment, system, installation or 
computer program. Documentation not updated to correspond changes. Lacking identiﬁcation label-
ling of equipment place.
3. Violation of procedure or order:  
Violation due to insufﬁcient knowledge or poor information. Deviations from procedure or order due 
to gradual organisational learning of “bad habits”. Or conscious violation.
4. Poor co-ordination, supervision or information transfer:  
Poor project co-ordination or supervision of subcontractors, poor information transfer due to organi-
sational changes or boundaries. Or weaknesses in experience feedback such as recurrence of events 
with known phenomena. Or poor quality control.
5. Insufﬁcient knowledge:  
Lacking training, specialist or cross-functional knowledge for work or planning tasks.
Table VI. Classiﬁcation and deﬁnition of root causes of multiple human errors in relation to maintenance.
STUK- YTO-TR 217
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to root causes, and missed detection in operative or 
organisational defensive barriers.
This extension of the basic error analyses to 
event analyses was done in interaction with plant 
maintenance and operability experts based on 
identiﬁcation of the multiple error candidates in 
the basic error analyses. The structured analysis 
facilitated to capture the “tacit knowledge” of the 
equipment place history before the fault detection 
and failure detection. The systematic event analy-
sis helped to pinpoint the weak barrier functions 
(such as identiﬁed in installation inspections or 
component testing done by maintenance personnel 
or functional testing done by operation personnel) 
and thus resulted in latent faults.
The identiﬁed dependent human errors were 
analysed and summarised in condensed mainte-
nance event reports which included a qualitative 
description of the:
• multiple error and its failure effects,
• originating erroneous or defective work task, 
and
• missed opportunity for detection, e.g. deﬁciency 
in operability veriﬁcation, allowing the errors 
remain latent in the system.
One of the maintenance event reports prepared 
during the multiple failure studies is given as an 
example in Table VIII.
As can be seen from the above example mainte-
nance event report, a combination of several fault 
repair work orders may be needed for identiﬁcation 
of common cause failures. In the studies, in average 
about two fault repair work orders were combined 
to build up a CCF event. The similar multiple faults 
had to been searched within the time frame of the 
surveillance testing interval or shorter. But some 
CCFs could be identiﬁed from single fault repair 
work orders, too.
Table VII. Principles in division of errors into single and multiple failures. 
Failure trigger
Failure in one single 
equipment place *)
Failures **) in parallel 
***) and similar 
equipment places
Failures **) in cascading 
****) equipment places
Similar repeated erroneous 
or omitted actions Single errors
  HCCF / HCCN or ODF****) ODF
One error Single error HSEF HSEF 
Several different errors Single errors Single errors Single errors
*) Equipment place is one by labelling identiﬁable operation place or equipment.    
**) Failures in parallel or cascading equipment refers to time – equipment failed at the same time.  
***) Parallel equipment refers to physically parallel train, sub or circuit, and cascading equipment to equipment in the 
same train, sub or circuit. 
****) Other dependent failure, if errors detected and repaired before returning the work permit to control room.  
Table VIII. An example of a maintenance event report.
Identiﬁer 
marking
Work order 
time and 
numbers Title and description of event
Operating event 
identiﬁer
1HCCF
YP12
1996-10-08 Deﬁcient adjustment and testing of the actuators as 
implementing new motor operated blowdown valves in 
the pressurizing system
No
238769D,
238769A
238769B
238769C
The gate valves 12YP12S038, 12YP12S039, and 11YP12S036, 11YP12S037 were 
not tight in hot state during power operation 1996-10-08.
New motor operated gate valves (MOVs) had been installed during the preceding 
maintenance outage in September 1996.
• The MOVs had to be closed as a corrective action by manual operations from the 
switch-gear during the power operation state at 1996-10-09.
• The common cause setting errors had passed from the maintenance outage 
through to the power operation period, because the setting and testing of the 
limit and torque switches of the MOVs in the cold state were insufﬁcient without 
hot start-up testing of the modiﬁcation work.
14
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4 Results from review of the bulk 
of error and event analyses
Introduction. The bulk of the multiple human 
errors (HCCFs and HCCNs), as well as single 
human errors, were statistically treated based on 
the classiﬁcations of the error and event analyses. 
Recurrence of the errors within different groups 
of the classiﬁcation classes, such as combinations 
of equipment and error types, equipment and root 
cause types, and erroneous task and missed bar-
rier types, were also searched in order to identify 
possible dominating problem areas. The underlying 
event or error analyses of the “possible problem 
areas” were thereupon reviewed qualitatively in 
order to identify recurrent problems and potential 
opportunities for remedial actions or practises.
Equipment affected by single errors. Ac-
cording to the review of the bulk of the analyses of 
single errors at the both plants, the instrumentation 
& control (IC) and electrical equipment were noticed 
to be more involved in human error caused failures 
than the other maintenance objects.
It should however be noticed that the more rare 
errors on mechanical equipment in safety related 
systems can however be serious and have caused 
forced plant outages in Finnish nuclear power 
units.
Multiple human error cases. In the following 
Tables IX and X, the identiﬁed and analysed func-
tionally critical multiple error events (HCCFs) are 
listed together with a short description, the affected 
equipment type and individual plant units. Only 
the short descriptions of the HCCFs are given as 
an example of the multiple human error problems 
in the following.
No descriptive examples of functionally non-
critical HCCNs (which are precursors to HCCFs) 
are given in the above Tables IX and X. The HCCNs 
Figure 1. Equipment types involved in single human errors in relation to maintenance.
IC = Instrumentation & control equipment or software, EL  = Electrical equipment, MEC = Mechanical equipment,  
VAL = Process valves, ventilation dampers or channel hatches, IVAL = Block or primary valves in instrument lines,  
RM = Radiation monitoring equipment
Olkiluoto 1 & 2. Equipment 
types involved in single human 
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have however been included in the following 
statistical treatment together with the function-
ally critical HCCFs. This has been done in order to 
facilitate a larger database of multiple human error 
mechanism which may be found recurring, and thus 
pinpoint potential opportunities for remedies. From 
the Tables IX and X you may directly identify that 
at least four HCCF mechanisms have been recur-
rent because they have occurred at the both units 
of a plant.
Table IX. Functionally critical human common cause failures at Olkiluoto NPP.
Nr. HCCF
Maintenance event  
Human originated common cause failures (HCCF)
Equipment 
type Plant unit
1 1HCCF531 The trip limits lowered on wrong neutron ﬂux trip conditions. IC OL 1
2 1HCCF531e Neutron ﬂux trip limits left too low after valve self-closure test. IC OL 1
3 1HCCF656 Power cables cut to the supply pumps of the diesel fuel tanks. EL OL 1
4 12HCC712 Difference pressure measurements crosswise connected in mussel 
ﬁlters.
IC OL 1 & 2
5 1HCCF747 Couplings broken between actuators and control valves. IC OL 1
6 12HCCF534 The actuation times too long due to mineral oil impurities in the 
anchors of the solenoid valves.
EL OL 1 & 2
7 2HCCF327 Simultaneous work in two subsystems of the auxiliary feedwater 
system during the refuelling outage of unit 2. No experience feedback 
to the refuelling outage of unit 1.
IC OL 2 (& 1)
8 2HCCF713 Turning pieces of ﬂow measurement devices mixed in assembly after 
cleaning.
IC OL 2 (& 1)
Table X. Functionally critical human common cause failures at Loviisa NPP.
Nr. HCCF
Maintenance event 
Human originated common cause failures (HCCF)
Equipment 
type
Plant 
unit
1 1HCCFRL30 The sensor cabling of the newly installed ultrasonic feed water ﬂow 
measurements melted during plant startup due to wrong insulation.
IC Loviisa 1
2 12HCCFVF62 The settings of the limit switches of the bafﬂe valves in service water 
system were omitted after reinstallation of the disconnected valves 
during modiﬁcation work in piping. The omission lead to leakege 
during operation.
EL Loviisa 2 
& 1
3 2HCCFRD50 Two of the closing valves in the HP steam extraction lines closed 3 
minutes slower during the shutdown procedure because the hysteris 
of the signals in the circuit boards was lacking after the maintenance 
outage.
IC Loviisa 1
4 1HCCFRN13 The settings of the replaced actuators of the closing valves in the 
auxiliary condensate system were performed at the cold state only 
leading to stiffness and torque switch trips in the warm operating 
state.
EL Loviisa 1
5 1HCCFRQ11 The settings of the repaired actuators of the closing valves in the 
auxiliary steam system were performed at the cold state only leading 
to torque switch trips before limit switch tripping as the valves were 
closed during power operation.
EL Loviisa 1
6 1HCCFSD72 The settings of the replaced actuators of the closing valves of 
the ejectors in the auxiliary condensate system were performed 
deﬁciently at the cold state only leading to torque switch trips as 
closed in the warm operating state.
EL Loviisa 1
7 1HCCFYP12 The setting and testing of the new blowdown valves in the 
presssurizer system were deﬁcient as performed only in cold state at 
the end of the modiﬁcation work. This resulted in leakage of the valves 
during power operation.
EL Loviisa 1
8 2HCCFTB33 The ﬂow measurements of the boron feed pumps did not function 
during pumping during power operation due to omission to open the 
closing valves of the instrument lines after the outage modiﬁcation 
works.
IVAL Loviisa 2
9 2HCCFRD11 The primary closing valves were forgotten in closed position in the 
insrument lines of the level measurements of the HP feed water 
heaters after the maintenance outage 1997.
IVAL Loviisa 2
10 12HC-
CFTH50
Uncertainties in work planning and management caused 
simulataneous unavailabilities in temperature measurement chains of 
the strainer pits during their periodic equipment testing
IC Loviisa 1 
& 2
11 1HCCFUW23 The reconnection of printers in the air- conditioning control room 
was forgotten until power operation after the maintenance outage 
preventive maintenance.
IC Loviisa 1
16
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Distribution of multiple errors into differ-
ent equipment. As seen in Figure 2, the dominance 
of the instrumentation & control control equipment, 
accompanied by the electrical equipment, already 
seen in the single errors, also applies to the multiple 
human errors (HCCFs and HCCNs).
The dominating involvement of the IC equipment 
in multiple and single errors should not depend on 
the IC’s error proneness only. The dominance comes 
from the high number of IC maintenance objects, and 
from the evident functional effects of such errors on 
IC, too. But this result emphasizes the responsibility 
and requirements of both the versatility and speciali-
sation of the design, maintenance and operability 
planning, as well as the needs of instrument mecha-
nician’s skills and knowledge of instrumentation and 
automation and its functional effects.
Direct causes of multiple errors. The domi-
nant error category of the human common cause 
failures was wrong setting at the both plants (see 
Figure 3). In the second plant Loviisa, the omissions 
to install connections and to set can in addition be 
itemized as dominating direct effects of the errors 
at equipment level.
Figure 2. Distribution of multiple human errors among equipment types.
Figure 3. Distribution of direct error categories among the multiple error cases.
Distribution of the HCCN and HCCF cases among the equipment types
IC = Instrumentation & control equipment and software, EL  = Electrical equipment, IVAL = Block or primary valves in instru-
ment lines, VAL = Process valves, ventilation dampers or channel hatches.
Olkiluoto 1 & 2 (1992–94). 
6
2
8
5
1
6
11
3
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
IC EL
To
ta
l
Equipment type
N
um
be
r o
f c
as
es
Loviisa 1 & 2 (1995–97). 
4 5
2
0
11
14
5
1
3
23
18
10
3 3
34
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
IC EL
IV
AL VA
L
To
ta
l
Equipment type
N
um
be
r o
f c
as
es
HCCF
HCCN
Total
 SET = wrong settings, OTH = other errors of commision, OM = errors of ommission, WDO = wrong direction or order, COM 
= errors of commission, COM/INST = installation omitted, OM/REAL = realignment omitted, WO = wrong order, WP = wrong 
place,  LF = too little force.
OL 1 & 2. Distribution of direct cause 
categories among the 14 HCCF and 
HCCN cases 
4
1 1
00
5
1
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
SE
T
O
TH O
M
W
DO
N
um
be
r
HCCF
HCCN
Loviisa 1 & 2. Distribution of direct cause 
categories among the 34 HCCF and HCCN 
cases
5
1
2
3
0 0 0 0
5 5
3
1
4
2 2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
SE
T
O
M
/IN
ST
O
TH
O
M
/R
EA
L
W
O
W
P LF
W
DO
N
um
be
r
STUK- YTO-TR 217
17
Origins of the human common cause fail-
ures. The sources of the common cause failures 
(HCCFs and HCCNs) could be searched in expert 
sessions from the plant information systems. The 
probable origin of the common cause failures was 
identiﬁed and evaluated by examining the earlier 
tasks from the work order history of the concerned 
equipment operation places or trains. In a number 
of the analysed multiple error events, the plant 
modiﬁcations appeared to be the main origin, but 
also the predetermined preventive maintenance 
was found to be a signiﬁcant source, especially in 
the Loviisa plant, see Figure 4.
Underlying causes of human common cause 
failures. Apart from the origins and direct causes, 
also the underlying “root” causes were studied for 
the human CCFs and human CCNs. The distribu-
tions of the root causes to the HCCFs and HCCNs 
at the both sites are to be found in the following 
Figure 5.
Weaknesses in planning of maintenance and 
operability veriﬁcation seem to contribute as un-
derlying causes into the occurrence of human 
common cause failures in the half of the cases at 
the both sites. The most of these problems occurred 
in relation to modiﬁcations, but also in preventive 
maintenance during outages.
Figure 4. The types of erroneous tasks leading to HCCFs and HCCNs.
OL 1 & 2. Erroneous task types of  multiple 
human errors
Functional 
testing
13%
2 cases
Periodic 
testing
13%
2 cases
Modification
47%
7 cases
Repair
13%
2 cases
Preventive 
mainte-nance
13%
2 cases
Loviisa 1 & 2. Erroneous task types of multiple 
human errors
Preventive 
mainte-nance
32%
11 cases
Repair
18%
6 cases
Modification
41%
14 cases
Installation
6%
2 cases
Functional 
testing
3%
1 case
Figure 5. Underlying causes to human CCFs and CCNs.
OL 1 & 2. Underlying causes of multiple human errors 
(HCCF and HCCN events).
13 - Planning 
deficiency
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Loviisa 1 & 2. Underlying causes of multiple human 
errors (HCCF and HCCN events).
14 - Design 
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13 - Planning 
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transfer
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The review of the results of the root causes of 
the analysed human common cause failure events 
indicate also that planning of maintenance work 
phases and operability veriﬁcation actions is a very 
demanding task due to the complex planning envi-
ronment of different objectives, safety requirements 
and instructions, and needs of multifunctional plant 
technical, maintenance and operability knowledge. 
The planning problems indicate also that operabil-
ity veriﬁcation after work in plant equipment and 
systems should be planned and implemented better 
as an integral part of the maintenance planning 
process and that it requires a combined knowledge 
of the maintenance and operation trades.
The signiﬁcant number of contributing causes 
“insufﬁcient knowledge” exhibit the need of special-
ist understanding and experience of speciﬁc compo-
nents at the personnel of the utility and contractors 
supervising and performing speciﬁc maintenance 
activities.
When considering remedial actions, it has to be 
taken into account that also interactions in work 
between different trades have contributed to the 
appearance of the multiple errors on equipment 
belonging to another maintenance trade than the 
faulty equipment.
In addition in the second plant Loviisa, design 
deﬁciencies of IC (instrumentation and control) 
concerning documentation of modiﬁcations and of 
maintainability also contributed to a signiﬁcant 
number of functionally non-critical common cause 
failures.
Multiple human errors stemming from re-
fuelling and maintenance outages. The review 
of the analysed set of both single and multiple hu-
man errors (HCCFs and HCCNs) at the both sites 
showed that most errors in relation to maintenance 
stem from the refuelling and maintenance outage 
periods. This is a natural result because the domi-
nating part of the modiﬁcations is performed during 
the annual outages.
Distribution of the plant operational states at 
failure detection, when the common cause failures 
originated from the refuelling and maintenance 
outages, is shown in Figure 6.
The more on left in the Figure 6 the operational 
states of the detection of the multiple failure events 
are, the better is the outcome of maintenance plan-
ning and operability veriﬁcation.
The analysis shows that more than half of the 
multiple human errors remained latent after the 
start-ups from outages to the power operating 
periods at both sites. At the Olkiluoto site about 
a third of the common cause failures were identi-
ﬁed promptly during the same outage before the 
start-up of the plant. The ﬁrst 15 percent of all the 
common cause failures which were detected during 
the outage at the Loviisa plant did not become 
Figure 6. Distribution of fault detection states of human common cause failures born during maintenance 
outages.
Type of detection: periodic testing or preventive maintenance (PREV), otherwise (OTH)
Operating states at detection: power operation (POW), refuelling outage prior to start-up (OUT), hot shutdown (HOT), cold 
shutdown (COLD), plant start-up (STUP), plant shutdown (SHDN) 
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functionally critical before their detection. They 
(HCCNs) however disturbed the plant start-up 
preparations at the end of the outage. At the Loviisa 
site, about 30 percent of the common cause failures 
could however be detected during the rather lengthy 
plant start-up following the outage before the power 
operation state.
The contents of the Figure 6 could represent 
a direct performance indicator of the quality 
and outcome of the maintenance and operability 
veriﬁcation planning at the nuclear power plants. 
Although this database of the HCCFs and HCCNs 
is rather small, it can however be concluded from 
the set of the thorough event analyses that a too 
large proportion of the common cause failures born 
during the outages remain latent in the technical 
systems up to the power operating periods. Thus 
there are development needs in maintenance and 
operability veriﬁcation planning for prevention of 
CCFs at the both NPP sites.
Detection activities of the human common 
cause failures. In the following Figure 7, the 
distributions are shown of the detection activities 
of the failures which were identiﬁed as human 
originated common cause failures (HCCFs and 
HCCNs).
The Figure 7 reveals that a small proportion of 
the common cause failures was detected in periodic 
testing, preventive maintenance or condition moni-
toring. At the Loviisa plant only 12 percent, i.e. four 
common cause failure (CCF) cases were identiﬁed in 
such periodic activities as periodic testing, periodic 
preventive maintenance or periodic condition moni-
toring. At the Olkiluoto plant, one third (5 cases of 
14 ) of the CCF cases were detected in periodic test-
ing (4 cases) or preventive maintenance (one case).
When the failure detection activities are studied 
of those common cause failures which have passed 
through from the outages to the power operating pe-
riods (see also Figure 5), the following observations 
can be done. Two failure cases of totally 5 cases 
detected at power operation at the Olkiluoto plant, 
were detected in periodic testing or periodic preven-
tive maintenance. In turn, at the Loviisa plant, only 
two cases of totally 14 CCF cases born during the 
maintenance outage and passing through to the 
power operation could be identiﬁed in a periodic 
test or periodic preventive maintenance activity. 
When the failure detection was studied of those 
common cause failures which were born during the 
operating periods, similar observations on periodic 
activities could be done. For instance, at the Loviisa 
plant eight common cause failures were born during 
the operating periods. None of these six HCCNs 
or two HCCFs were detected in periodic testing or 
maintenance, but by chance, through alarms or on 
demand.
The detection of such a small proportion of the 
common cause failures in periodic testing activities 
indicates that operability veriﬁcation (i.e. instal-
lation checks, functional testing, start-up testing) 
at the end of the complex maintenance works and 
the modiﬁcations in important systems should be 
improved. The planning of the coverage and con-
tents of the operability veriﬁcation requires in such 
cases tailoring instead of performing the standard 
Figure 7. Distribution of the detection activity types of human common cause failures (HCCFs and HCCNs).
OL 1 & 2. Distribution of the detection methods of the 
multiple human errors
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periodic tests of the equipment at the end of work.
It can also be concluded that maintenance and 
modiﬁcation related errors originating from power 
operation are more inconvenient to detect imme-
diately by proper installation checks, functional 
or start-up testing (which are more suitable at the 
end of outages and the plant start-ups) because of 
operational disturbance risks and restrictions.
Weaknesses in the operative defensive 
barriers. An analysis of the broken operative bar-
riers against human common cause failures was 
performed as a part of the thorough “maintenance 
event” analyses. For statistical compilation of the 
broken operative barriers one front-line broken 
barrier per HCCF and HCCN case was selected. 
The analysed set of human common cause failures 
showed that the most missed primary opportunities 
for detection were in the installation checks and 
inspections of maintenance work, repairs and modi-
ﬁcations, and in start-up testing of modiﬁcations. 
Thus there are most development needs in installa-
tion checks including component tests performed by 
the maintenance branch, and in the start-up tests 
of modiﬁcations performed by the operation branch, 
see Figure 8.
In addition, at the Loviisa plant the func-
tional tests at the end of preventive maintenance 
or repairs performed by the operation branch were 
identiﬁed as signiﬁcant contributors to the weak-
nesses in the operative defensive barriers against 
the common cause failures.
Weaknesses in the organisational defensive 
barriers. The organisational defensive barriers 
against dependent human errors are checks, re-
Figure 8. Weaknesses identiﬁed in operative defensive barriers against human CCFs.
Figure 9. Weaknesses identiﬁed in organisational defensive barriers against common cause failures.
OL 1 & 2. Ineffective operative 
defensive barriers against HCCFs 
and HCCNs.
4 4
3
2
1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
St
ar
t-u
p
tes
t
Int
all
ati
on
ch
ec
k
Ad
jus
tin
g
Pe
rio
dic
tes
t
Sh
ift
su
pe
rv
iso
r
Nu
m
be
r o
f c
as
es
Loviisa 1 & 2. Ineffective operative 
defensive barriers against HCCFs 
and HCCNs.
11 10
5 5
2 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ins
tal
lat
ion
ch
ec
k
Fu
nc
tio
na
l
tes
t
St
ar
t-u
p t
es
t
No
 ea
rli
er
ve
rif
ica
tio
n
po
ss
ibl
e
Al
ign
m
en
t
ch
ec
k
Pr
ev
en
tiv
e
m
ain
ten
an
ce
Nu
m
be
r o
f c
as
es
OL 1 & 2. Weaknesses in 
organizational defensive barriers 
against HCCFs and HCCNs. 
7
2 2 2
1
0
2
4
6
8
Re
vi
ew
 o
f
st
ar
t-u
p
te
st
in
g
pr
og
ra
m
Tr
ai
ni
ng
,
fe
db
ac
k
W
or
k 
an
d
op
er
ab
ili
ty
pl
an
ni
ng
Co
nt
ra
ct
or
su
pe
rv
is
io
n
De
si
gn
re
vi
ew
N
um
be
r o
f c
as
es
Loviisa 1 & 2. Weaknesses in 
organizational defensive barriers 
against HCCFs and HCCNs.
15
6 5
3 3
1 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
W
or
k a
nd
op
er
ab
ilit
y
pla
nn
ing
No
 ea
rli
er
ve
rif
ica
tio
n
po
ss
ibl
e
Re
vie
w 
of
stu
p t
es
tin
g
pr
og
ra
m
De
sig
n
re
vie
w
Co
nt
ra
cto
r
su
pe
rv
isi
on
QC
 - c
on
tro
l
Fe
ed
ba
ck
Nu
m
be
r o
f c
as
es
STUK- YTO-TR 217
21
views and proactive actions performed by engineers, 
managers, safety and quality control personnel or 
contractor supervisors not directly involved in the 
operative or the same work in the plant units. In 
this simpliﬁed barrier analysis, it was looked for one 
broken organisational barrier per each HCCF and 
HCCN case (see Fig. 9).
The results indicate that an adequate review 
of the start-up testing programs of the modiﬁca-
tions would have offered the best opportunity 
to strengthen the organiational barriers against 
common cause failures at the both sites. Also an 
appropriate review of the work and test planning 
of the work orders would have offered signiﬁcant 
opportunities to correct weaknesses in the organi-
sational barriers against common cause failures. In 
addition, weaknesses in contractor supervision and 
knowledge were in some speciﬁc cases identiﬁed as 
contributors to common cause failures.
Also weaknesses in the design review have 
in some speciﬁc cases allowed deﬁcient technical 
dicumentation to pass through to use thus contrib-
uting to common cause failures in connection to 
modiﬁcation or repair work. The non-closure of the 
experience feedback loop was also considered here 
as a broken organisational barrier in such recurrent 
cases where a similar HCCF/HCCN mechanisms 
occurred at both units of the plant and no corrective 
actions were inbetween implemented.
The number of human originated common 
cause failures. The annual average of the number 
of human common cause failures (sum of HCCFs 
and HCCNs) through the studied calendar years is 
app. 5 cases per year at Olkiluoto plant and app. 11 
at Loviisa plant. The annual numbers of the events 
are shown in the Figure 10.
When comparing the numbers of the different 
plants Olkiluoto and Loviisa, the annual averages 
of the functionally critical human CCFs are 2,67 
resp. 3,67, i.e. in the same order of magnitude. The 
signiﬁcant differences in the amount of the multiple 
human errors come from the higher number at the 
Loviisa plant of the functionally non-critical human 
common failures (HCCNs). HCCNs are, as earlier 
mentioned, precursors to the functionally critical 
common cause failures (HCCFs).
It should also be noticed that the ﬁgure shows 
the year of detection of the HCCFs and HCCNs. 
The multiple human errors have in the most cases 
born during the same year, but in a part of the cases 
during the earlier years.
Because of the limited analysis periods of the 
multiple human errors, no conclusions of their 
timely trends can be drawn. Despite the variations 
in the annual numbers, the averages of those an-
nual numbers can be used as reference values when 
similar analyses for evaluation of the performance 
of maintenance and operability planning, and of the 
recurrence of the human common cause failures, are 
done in the future.
Figure 10. Annual distribution of HCCFs and HCCNs through 3 calendar years.
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Suitable performance indicators for the future 
evaluation of the human originated common cause 
failures in relation to maintenance could thus be:
• The number of human common cause failures 
(HCCFs and HCCNS) stemming from the main-
tenance outages and passing through to the 
operating periods (see Figure 6),
• The moving average of three years of the annual 
number of the human common common cause 
failures (HCCFs and HCCNs) in relation to 
maintenance,
• The annual number of HCCFs and HCCNs in 
the safety related systems (subjected to require-
ments in the Limiting Conditions for Operation 
of Technical Speciﬁcations).
In addition, the annual number of maintenance 
rework covering both single and multiple errors 
would be a good indicator on human performance 
and quality in maintenance work and planning. 
Prevention of human errors in maintenance and 
repairs is prevention of rework.
Safety signiﬁcance of the human common 
cause failures in relation to maintenance. A 
signiﬁcant number of human errors and common 
cause failures took place in safety related systems. 
For instance at the TVO plant 6 of the 8 cases of the 
human originated common cause failures, and 3 of 
the 6 functionally non-critical human cause failures 
were in the safety related systems. In turn at the 
Loviisa plant, 5 of 11 cases of human CCFs, and 9 of 
the 23 human CCNs, were in safety systems.
At the Olkiluoto plant, in 10 of the all 14 multi-
ple human error cases more than two components 
were affected. In turn at the Loviisa plant more 
than two components were affected in 9 of the all 
34 multiple human error cases.
Although no risk increase factors using PSA 
models [NKA/RAS-450 1990] were calculated, it can 
be concluded that human common cause failures 
in relation to maintenance and modiﬁcations ap-
parently have a signiﬁcant safety inﬂuence. But 
much more safety degradations would have been 
caused, if no preventive maintenance or renewal of 
equipment took place. This is shown by e.g. ageing 
related common cause failures which occurred due 
to lacking preventive maintenance identiﬁed during 
the earlier study [Laakso, Pyy & Reiman 1998].
In addition to the safety systems, all other plant 
systems were covered in the search and analysis of 
the human common cause failures due to the fact 
that human error mechanisms may be similar at 
the different parts of the plant. Thus, a more exten-
sive database was obtained for learning of multiple 
error mechanisms to prevent the signiﬁcant human 
common cause failures.
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5 Conclusions and recommendations
Conclusions, proposals for remedies and recom-
mendations on improvement needs are presented 
in the following chapter based on ﬁndings from the 
studies and maintenance R&D concerning the both 
nuclear power plants.
Quality of maintenance planning and oper-
ability veriﬁcation. The review of the analysed 
set of both single and multiple human errors (HC-
CFs and HCCNs) at the both sites showed that most 
errors in relation to maintenance stem from the 
refuelling and maintenance outage periods. This is 
natural because a larger part of all modiﬁcations is 
installed during the annual outages than during op-
eration. The earlier Figure 6 shows the distribution 
of the plant operational states at failure detection, 
when the common cause failures originated from 
the refuelling and maintenance outages.
The analysis shows that more than half of 
the multiple human errors (HCCFs and HCCNs) 
remained latent after the start-ups from outages to 
the power operating periods at the both sites. The 
contents of the Figure 6 could represent a direct 
performance indicator of the quality and outcome 
of the maintenance and operability veriﬁcation 
planning at the nuclear power plants. Although the 
event analysis database of the HCCFs and HCCNs 
is rather small, it can however be concluded from 
this set of thoroughly and systematically performed 
event analyses that a too large proportion of com-
mon cause failures from the outages remain latent 
in the technical systems to the power operating 
periods. The analysis results also showed that the 
multiple human error events revealed during power 
operation were detected in periodic testing or peri-
odic maintenance only in two cases at each plant. 
This suggests improvement needs in planning of 
the maintenance and installation inspection, func-
tional testing and operability veriﬁcation phases 
connected to the work actions during outages on 
important equipment and systems.
But at ﬁrst we start with a description of require-
ments on activities and knowledge on maintenance 
management and work.
Requirements on maintenance activities 
and work practises. The detailed analysis, clas-
siﬁcation and statistical treatment of the mainte-
nance related errors have provided information for 
focusing organisation-psychological studies into 
most relevant aspects in maintenance and oper-
ability. The aim of the organisation- psychological 
studies in Finnish NPPs has been to develop a 
model for the maintenance core task and assess 
the maintenance culture. The case studies started 
at the Loviisa and continued at the Olkiluoto and 
Forsmark nuclear power plants [Reiman, Oedewald 
& Rollenhagen 2005].
The critical demands of maintenance and the in-
strumental demands needed to respond to the criti-
cal demands were conceptualised by a maintenance 
core task analysis. The model depicts maintenance 
as balancing between the three critical demands of 
Anticipating, Reacting and Monitoring & Reﬂecting 
as well as between the instrumental demands.
The organisational core task model was used to 
assess the safety and efﬁciency of organisational 
cultures of the maintenance organisations by help 
of interviews, observation, survey and workgroups. 
Among others, in the analysis of the interview 
data and group working sessions at the nuclear 
power plants concerning the maintenance core task 
demands in one’s own maintenance work following 
tensions could be identiﬁed:
• situational judgement vs. generally applicable 
rules,
• certainty vs. uncertainty about the effects of 
maintenance actions,
• specialisation vs. maintaining overview.
24
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In the assessment of the maintenance culture, the 
idea was that if the instrumental demands (Flex-
ibility, Methodicalness and Learning) are carried 
out well in the organisation, you can suppose that 
the maintenance organisation is able to fulﬁll the 
critical demands. In the Figure 11, the maintenance 
management and work practises (such as prioritisi-
tion of work tasks, coordination of tasks between 
different technical disciplines and activities, deﬁni-
tion of responsibilities, planning of maintenance 
program, information management, transparency 
of actions & documentation of work and ﬁndings, 
veriﬁcation of operability, adhering to work permit 
procedures, and restoring of operability) needed 
for the implementation of the critical demands of 
maintenance are also shown [Oedewald & Reiman 
2003].
The critical demand Anticipating of the mainte-
nance activity refers to the intention to anticipate 
the condition of the equipment and the state of the 
plant and the effects of the maintenance actions, 
and to plan the needed maintenance tasks and 
resources in advance. Reacting refers detecting and 
diagnosing deviations and acting accordingly. It 
requires thus readiness to restore the operability 
of equipment and systems after sudden failures of 
critical equipment, expected failures on non-critical 
equipment or ﬁndings in periodic testing of equip-
ment or systems. Monitoring and reﬂecting refer to 
the uncertain nature of the knowledge concerning 
the condition and state of the equipment and 
systems. Reﬂectivity means a critical reviewing of 
the effectiveness and results of the maintenance 
actions and of the bases on which the maintenance 
tasks are founded.
The organisational core task model depicts 
knowledge creation and problem solving activ-
ity as being inherent in the maintenance activity 
and brings thus the demands of the maintenance 
management and work close to that of knowledge 
work. In the following sections, recommended im-
provements and proposed actions originating from 
the results of the human common cause failure and 
error studies are given to the maintenance manage-
ment and work tasks. In the recommendations and 
proposals, a reference is also given to the (often) 
conﬂicting critical, instrumental or knowledge 
demands of the tasks concerned.
Planning of operability veriﬁcation in rela-
tion to small or ordinary modiﬁcations. The 
review of the analysed multiple errors showed that 
difﬁculties in planning of the necessary testing and 
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Figure 11. The demands concerning management and performance of maintenance activities and work [Reiman, 
T. et al 2005].
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installation inspections of small and ordinary (not 
big) plant modiﬁcations were signiﬁcant sources of 
common cause failures. More than half of the hu-
man common cause failures from outages remained 
latent into the power operating periods. The most 
multiple human errors originating from small or 
ordinary modiﬁcations, such as e.g. renewals of ac-
tuators, motor operated valves and solenoid valves, 
changes in transformers, or introduction of differ-
ence pressure measurements, position indications 
or switches as modiﬁcations or as a part of them, 
could be reduced by a more tailored deﬁnition and 
coverage of their start-up testing programs.
In planning the modiﬁcations in parallel trains 
of important equipment, the needs of staggered 
implementation, the real operating conditions such 
temperatures, pressures or pressure differences 
for testing, and the multiple train risks should be 
evaluated and considered.
After modiﬁcations or intrusive maintenance in 
important equipment condition monitoring would 
be recommended for reducing the uncertainty about 
equipment operability or reliability.
The operability planning and veriﬁcation tasks of 
small or ordinary modiﬁcations are complex and are 
subjected to the critical demands of both Anticipation 
and Monitoring & Reﬂecting and require thus bal-
ancing between the Methodicalness and Flexibility 
as well as Learning. The planning task requires 
both a functional overview & technical specialist 
knowledge as instruments for quality results.
Planning of maintenance and operability 
of complex or intrusive preventive mainte-
nance and repairs. Improvements could also be 
achieved by identifying better in the work planning 
from the operating experiences those complex or 
intrusive repair and preventive maintenance work 
tasks and actions which are prone to errors and 
can introduce unwanted changes in the function 
of equipment or systems. Such uncertain cases in 
important equipment require a tailored planning 
of the coverage of the installation inspections of 
their instrumentation, automation and electrical 
equipment and the functional testing of equipment 
effected. This planning case shall include a need 
evaluation of the functional testing at both com-
ponent and system level. The tension between the 
situational judgement and the generally applicable 
routines is manifested in this concrete planning 
situation where it is no longer clear if the normal 
periodic testing task can be deﬁned as the sufﬁcient 
operability veriﬁcation action in the work order. 
Generally for important equipment, a functional 
test should be added as a planned task into its 
preventive maintenance programme to assure the 
functional operability after work.
In planning the test arrangements of important 
equipment in parallel trains, the needs of stag-
gered testing , the real operating conditions and 
the multiple train risks should be evaluated. and 
considered. For instance, at the second of the plants 
maintenance and testing actions in parallel redun-
dancies was recently replanned to different weeks 
and a trains’ crossing effects inspection by control 
room is obligatory in exceptions.
The operability planning and veriﬁcation tasks 
of cumbersome or intrusive repair and preventive 
maintenance works are complex and are subjected 
to the critical demands of both Anticipation and 
Monitoring & Reﬂecting and require thus balanc-
ing between the Methodicalness and Flexibility as 
well as Learning. The planning task requires both 
a technical specialist & functional overview knowl-
edge as instruments for quality results.
Spare part changes or minor changes in 
parts to be identiﬁed as minor modiﬁcations. 
Some events demonstrate that minor modiﬁcations 
are sometimes introduced unknowingly, when a 
new spare part, component or part contains changes 
as compared to the earlier versions [NEA/CSNI/
R(2004)17, NEA/CSNI/R (27.4.2005)]. Spare part 
changes or minor changes in parts should be bet-
ter identiﬁed as minor changes in maintenance 
planning and work. Changes in material, size, 
form or lubrication of the parts can be such minor 
modiﬁcations which have a deviating failure effect 
on the equipment or system function. Examples 
can be e.g. wrong screws, fuses, relays, switches, 
cables or guards. Such minor changes in important 
equipment should be subjected to the plant modiﬁ-
cation process, instead of the repair or maintenance 
process only, to allow a proper technical and safety 
review and functional test planning before imple-
mentation into operation.
This identiﬁcation and planning task is sub-
jected to the critical demands of both Anticipation 
and Monitoring and requires both Learning and 
Methodicalness as well as technical specialist 
knowledge down to a detailed level as instruments 
for quality results.
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Planning and decision of modiﬁcations. 
The review of the analysed multiple errors showed 
that difﬁculties with small and normal plant modi-
ﬁcations and in planning of their operability were 
signiﬁcant sources of common cause failures. A mod-
iﬁcation in an operating plant should be considered 
as a risk. Thus modiﬁcations in old plants should 
always be very well justiﬁed. Thousands of small or 
ordinary technical modiﬁcations were implemented 
at the studied plants during the analysis periods. 
It is in the design and implementation difﬁcult to 
cover all latent functional relationships, failure 
modes and effects of the modiﬁcations without a 
good functional analysis of interdependencies and 
well planned and comprehensive start-up testing 
programs. The testing program of modiﬁcations 
shall correspond to the real operating conditions 
and cover both the component and system levels.
Modiﬁcations which are needed to provide 
signiﬁcant safety, reliability, capacity, efﬁciency 
or maintainability remedies of shortcomings or 
enhancements, including related auxiliary system 
changes, are naturally justiﬁed. As well, the obsolete 
technology which exhibits missing spares and know-
how has to be replaced. However to select the best 
decision option, a risk evaluation of e.g. teething 
problems of the design and function of the modiﬁca-
tion should be included in the decision criteria.
This complex planning and decision task is 
subjected to the critical demands of Anticipation 
and Reﬂecting and requires both Methodicalness 
and Learning as well as the functional overview 
& specialist knowledge as instruments for quality 
results.
Turn-over procedures. Distinct turn-over and 
acceptance procedures of the technical modiﬁcations 
and their documentation between the different 
modiﬁcation project phases are recommended for 
consideration. Distinct turn-overs from the design 
& delivery phase to the installation phase at plant, 
and from the installation phase to the start-up 
testing & operation phase between the responsible 
organisational units (both internal suppliers and 
customers) are proposed. Such strict acceptance 
practises were applied before the turn-overs of 
single technical systems during the installation and 
start-up testing phases of the latest Nordic BWRs. 
These procedures would help as organisational 
defensive barriers to prevent better the unﬁnished 
modiﬁcations and deﬁcient procedures or documen-
tation from passing through into installation and 
operation.
Living Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). 
A signiﬁcant number of human errors and common 
cause failures took place in safety related systems. 
For instance at the TVO plant 6 of the 8 cases of the 
human originated common cause failures, and 3 of 
the 6 functionally non-critical human cause failures 
were in the safety related systems. In turn at the 
Loviisa plant, 5 of 11 cases of human CCFs, and 9 of 
the 23 human CCNs, were in safety systems.
In addition to the safety systems, all other plant 
systems were covered in the search and analysis 
of the human common cause failures to obtain a 
larger database and understanding of such human 
error mechanisms that can lead to safety signiﬁcant 
human common cause failures.
A check of the coverage of the identiﬁed multiple 
human errors in the common cause failure models, 
mechanisms, event sequences and data in the PSA 
studies of today is therefore recommended.
Although no risk increase factors using PSA 
models [NKA/RAS-450 1990] were calculated dur-
ing the studies, it can be concluded that human 
common cause failures in relation to maintenance 
and modiﬁcations apparently have a signiﬁcant 
safety inﬂuence and that living PSA can be used 
for determination of the safety importance of 
parallel equipment prone to CCFs in relation to 
maintenance.
This interactive PSA analysis task requires both 
Methodicalness and Learning as well as a good 
overall knowledge of the functional relationships 
as instruments for quality results.
Grading of planning requirements and 
review of work orders. Grading the planning 
requirements of the maintenance objects based on 
their safety and availability importance or work 
complexity would also help to prioritise the resource 
allocation for planning. At both utilities a grading of 
equipment into four different maintenance classes 
based on plant level safety, availability and cost 
objectives is already available. This prioritisation 
could also help to select the work orders and plans 
which should be reviewed before the work permit. 
For instance nowadays, at one of the utilities the 
operation maintenance coordinators, operation tech-
nicians and maintenance foremen review the work 
orders of the next week in weekly meetings. These 
reviews can lead into requirements to improve the 
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work description, object deﬁnition or testing in 
individual work orders.
The complex and multitechnical repair or pre-
ventive maintenance actions should be identiﬁed 
in planning. One should therefore review from 
the maintenance information system, whether 
the repair or maintenance actions are according 
to operating experiences prone to errors or could 
imply changes in the function of the equipment or 
system. Such cases in important equipment would 
require a larger or a tailored coverage of installation 
inspections and functional testing.
This management and planning task is subjected 
to the critical demand of Anticipation and requires 
both Learning and Methodicalness as well as func-
tional overall & specialist technical knowledge as 
instruments for quality results.
Planning of effective preventive mainte-
nance tasks. Maintenance strategies and effec-
tive maintenance tasks for prevention of failures 
on equipment and systems can be selected by 
the experience based RCM planning approach 
[Laakso, Simola & Hänninen 2002]. In planning 
the maintenance strategies, tasks and actions, the 
dependability requirements of different equipment 
are speciﬁed based on the importance of the equip-
ment for fulﬁlling the plant level objectives of safety, 
availability and cost.
In the operating plants, the EBRCM method uti-
lises the maintenance history data in the planning 
of changes into the preventive (condition based and 
predetermined) maintenance tasks and intervals 
, including small redesigns, to reach the reliabil-
ity and maintenance objectives. Identiﬁcation and 
planning of effective preventive tasks for detection 
and prevention of common cause failures and er-
rors, and for operability veriﬁcation, connected to 
the preventive maintenance work of the important 
equipment shall be integrated to the PM planning 
approach and deﬁned in the PM programs.
Deﬁnition of the maintenance strategies of 
equipment and systems- deﬁnition of the bases on 
which and when preventive tasks need to be done- 
reduces also the potential for error by improving the 
meaningfullness and motivation of the work and by 
reducing sometimes inadvertent initiators.
This complex maintenance management and 
programme planning task is subjected to the 
critical demands of Anticipation and Reﬂecting and 
requires both Methodicalness and Learning as well 
as the functional overview & specialist knowledge 
as instruments for quality results.
Use of condition monitoring for identiﬁca-
tion of deviations and maintenance steering. 
A survey of the use of condition monitoring informa-
tion for maintenance planning at three Nordic nu-
clear plants indicates that condition monitoring is 
increasingly implemented, but very selectively and 
in a rather slow pace for condition based preventive 
maintenance. A combined strategy of condition 
based preventive maintenance and predetermined 
preventive maintenance is applied for important 
Figure 12. Effectiveness of distinct maintenance strategies to reach the dependability objectives of equipment 
and systems.
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equipment such as main circulation pumps, genera-
tors, steam turbines and turbine condensers and to 
some extent for motor or pneumatically operated 
closing valves [Laakso, Rosqvist & Paulsen 2003]. 
This combined strategy is thus applied to eliminate 
or reduce functionally critical failures and damages 
on very important equipment.
Condition based maintenance strives to prevent 
the functional failure of equipment by utilis-
ing condition monitoring information, information 
systems and personnel expertise for identiﬁcation 
of deviations and maintenance steering of neces-
sary preventive maintenance actions instead of 
performing the predetermined maintenance tasks 
at predetermined time points. An increased use and 
analysis of existing condition monitoring informa-
tion have a great potential in increasing condition 
based preventive maintenance [Laakso, Rosqvist & 
Paulsen 2003]. The analysis of condition monitoring 
information would increase the certainty about 
equipment condition. One way to reduce the number 
of errors and unavailability of equipment is to avoid 
unnecessary maintenance which has the potential 
to cause unnecessary failures. Using condition 
monitoring information to steer the preventive 
maintenance to correspond better the real needs 
[Laakso, Hänninen, & Hallin 1995] could thus also 
reduce the number of error prone predetermined 
intrusive and disassembling maintenance actions 
performed. In early life failures caused by errors 
in installations or disassembling maintenance, the 
use of planned condition monitoring can also help to 
discover pre-existing defects prior to their develop-
ment into functional failures by environmental or 
operational loads such as vibration, heat, tempera-
ture transients, activations etc.
A more situation speciﬁc steering of preventive 
maintenance actions to restore the degraded equip-
ment condition to standard condition before devel-
opment of functional failures would also contribute 
to a better utilisation of the personnel expertise 
and equipment responsibility. The use of process 
monitoring information and control room better 
for condition monitoring of equipment would also 
contribute as a help. An effective use of process in-
formation for analysis of the condition of equipment 
requires a good access of the maintenance personnel 
to this information. Thus the condition based pre-
ventive maintenance strategy puts new demands 
on ﬂexibility and knowledge based approach of 
working instead of the rule based approach of the 
predetermined periodic maintenance.
It is recommended to integrate the condition 
monitoring into the functional testing phase of the 
modiﬁcations or intrusive maintenance for impor-
tant equipment. Increased use of effective condition 
monitoring for operative identiﬁcation of deviations 
and steering of maintenance actions instead of 
predetermined and intrusive maintenance tasks is 
recommended. Examples of good working practises 
at the both plant sites are such co-operation where 
the control room personnel performs the testing and 
the maintenance personnel the condition monitor-
ing simultaneously in certain periodic testing of 
rotating standby safety equipment.
This identiﬁcation, planning, decision and work 
Figure 13. A diagram showing the information sources and decision context related to operative maintenance 
steering based on condition monitoring.
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task of condition based maintenance seems to 
be most difﬁcult because it is subjected to the all 
critical demands Monitoring, Reacting, and Antici-
pation. And it requires the conﬂicting instruments 
Felixibility and Methodicalness as well as Learning 
and specialist knowledge as instruments for quality 
results.
Adjustment needs of the pre-planned work 
orders. At planned maintenance or installation of 
equipment such as e.g. electric motors, valves or 
piping, it has proven necessary to disconnect extra 
cables or actuators to facilitate the planned work 
locally in the plant. Sometimes these unplanned 
work objects have not been reconnected or recon-
nected poorly during the work. But the correspond-
ing increased needs of installation inspections or 
functional testing after the work of this additionally 
ﬁxed equipment have remained unnoticed leading 
to common cause failure cases during operation.
A more agile initiation of necessary adjustments 
to the pre-planned work orders to correspond the 
speciﬁc local or new conditions identiﬁed at work 
by maintenance personnel would have helped. The 
question is also whether it is acceptable to make a 
personal judgement and perform the work needed, 
or should the work be interrupted until the new 
work order is planned and permitted.
This planning and work task is subjected to 
the critical demands of Reﬂecting and Reacting 
and requires both Flexibility and Learning as well 
as adhering to work permit procedures and the 
knowledge of the technical function as instruments 
for quality results.
Understanding the maintenance and oper-
ability veriﬁcation process. Modelling of the 
maintenance and operability veriﬁcation process 
including the organisational interfaces, covering 
both maintenance and small modiﬁcations, is 
recommended. The errors, their progress, missed 
detection and occurrence of the common cause 
failures could also be compared with the process 
models and be made visible in them. The model-
ling would help to increase the understanding of 
the planning practises and work order procedures 
and identify and visualize the possible weaknesses 
requiring remedies in the process of maintenance 
and operability.
This planning task is subjected to the critical 
demands of Anticipation and Reﬂecting and it re-
quires both Methodicalness and Learning as well as 
an overall knowledge of maintenance and operation 
as instruments for quality results.
Identiﬁcation, reporting, event analysis 
and operative prevention of common cause 
failures. A new solution has been implemented 
in the new power plant information systems at 
the both Finnish NPP sites for identiﬁcation and 
reporting of common cause failures. This enhance-
ment will complement the earlier failure and repair 
work order feedback data. The information is given 
on the screen of the power plant information system 
by a question and relevant text description of a 
suspected common cause failure.
This routine will help to operatively identify 
CCFs better in the future from the plant informa-
tion system and to start continuous human and 
technical CCF event investigations for their preven-
tion. Already today, the “operation event reports” 
at one of the sites cover rather well that part of 
the CCF cases which are timely identiﬁed. Also a 
promising reporting and treatment system of devia-
tions and near misses at the other site was recently 
implemented. However the “maintenance event 
related” CCF cases have remained more undetected 
and thus have not been adequately reported.
A fault repair process model, including inspec-
tions of the prospect of a CCF, for one of the Finnish 
sites has been prepared to support the above opera-
tive investigation and prevention task. The follow-
ing process ﬂow model shows, how you proceed 
from the failure detection through the activities of 
work planning, safety actions of the work, repair 
work, restoration of the safety actions, testing and 
start-up of the work object up to the acceptance of 
the work and closing the activities in the history 
part of the plant information system. A part of the 
activities will include checkpoints for the own or in-
dependent inspections to be performed by the actors 
from maintenance or operation. The checkpoints are 
given in Fig. 14 with *-marks.
In the above process model the activities are 
supervised by controls or rules which are coming 
as arrows from top and and resourced by organisa-
tional branches which are given down in the activ-
ity boxes. For instance, in connection to the safety 
actions of the work, the shift supervisor performs 
an inspection of the possible train crossing effects 
in order to identify and prevent possible common 
cause failures in safety related systems controlled 
by Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO).
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As the reporting activity of ﬁnal feedback 
information is ﬁnishing the maintenance work in 
the information system, a suspected CCF can be 
conﬁrmed, analysed and reported or alternatively 
struck off as a common cause failure. This can be 
performed in a further investigation in co-opera-
tion between maintenance, operation and safety 
branches.
In the operating plants, it is easiest to imple-
ment new routines such as above for identiﬁcation, 
reporting and prevention of human and technical 
common cause failures and errors when the plant 
information system is renewed or upgraded and 
the ways of acting are simultaneously deﬁned, 
modiﬁed and trained. This opportunity was used 
for implementation of the classiﬁcation of direct 
errors of this report (see Table IV) when deﬁning 
lately the new failure classiﬁcation and reporting 
for the new plant information system of one of the 
Finnish NPP sites.
A further developent of maintenance and techni-
cal personnels’ responsibilities of the function and 
dependability of speciﬁc equipment and systems 
are also expected to improve the use of feedback 
reporting of failures and maintenance in the plant 
information systems for follow-up, analysis and 
planning for prevention or reduction of multiple and 
recurrent errors in future.
Training. The event analyses of maintenance 
and operability related multiple and single errors 
would provide a good plant-speciﬁc material for 
training of the maintenance, operation and technical 
personnel. This improves understanding of the error 
mechanisms for learning, and error identiﬁcation 
and prevention purposes, as well as for maintenance 
quality assurance. The training should also include 
the deﬁnitions of common cause failures and types 
of direct errors on equipment supported by exam-
ples from the event and error descriptions.
Maintenance and operability planning ac-
tivity. The review of the results of the root causes 
of the analysed human common cause failure events 
indicate that planning of maintenance work phases 
and operability veriﬁcation tasks is a very demand-
ing task due to the complex planning environment 
of different objectives, safety requirements and 
instructions, and needs of multifunctional plant 
technical, maintenance and functional knowledge. 
The planning task demands both Anticipation and 
Reﬂecting and balancing between the Methodical-
ness and Flexibility as well as Learning which bring 
it to a knowledge work.
Thus the results of this analysis show that 
maintenance and operability planning should not 
be regarded as separate functions at the plants but 
Figure 14. A fault repair process with a view to operative identiﬁcation and prevention of CCFs.  
(check points *- marked).
��������������
�����������
�������������������
���������
��������������������
��������
���������
���������������
����������� ��
�������������
����������
������������
�������������
������������
�����������������
�������������������
������� ����
��������������
�������������
����������������
������������������
����������������
��������������
��������������������
�����������������
���������������
���������������
���� �������������
���������
���������������
����������������
������
�����������������
��������
���� �����
����
������������
������������������
����������
��������������������
������������������
��������������
����������
�����������
��������������������������������
������������������
��������������������������������������������� �����������������������������
��������������������������������������������������������������������������
���������������������
��������������������
�������������������������
���������
�����������������
���������
��������������
��������������
�������������������
���������������
������������������
���������
����������������
�����������
����������������
��������������
�����������������
�����������
��������������
������������������
��������
����������
��������������������������������
�������������������������������
������������������
�� ������������������������������
���������������
�����������������������
��������������������
��������
������� ���������������������������������������������
��������������������������������������������������
�������������
���������������
�����������������
���������������
�����������
������������
����� ����������������������
����������������
�������������������
������������������
��������
��������������
��������������������
������������������
������������
�������������������������
�������������
��������������������������
��������������������
��������������
��������������������
�������������������������
������������������ ������������
���
STUK- YTO-TR 217
31
performed better as an integrated planning requir-
ing the joint knowledge of both the maintenance 
and operation branches. This conclusion is also 
conﬁrmed by the ﬁndings from the studies of op-
erational readiness veriﬁcation in Swedish nuclear 
plants [Hollnagel, E., Gauthereau, V., Persson, B. 
2004].
Good examples of recent co-operative develop-
ments at the Finnish nuclear power plants are the 
maintenance planner on duty in the control room 
during the maintenance outages at one of the sites, 
and maintenance supervisors for daily coordination 
of plant maintenance and condition monitoring at 
the operation organisation at the other site.
Concluding remarks. Although a large part 
of the studied error events may be suggested as 
negative experience, the experts and managers in 
the nuclear power plants and regulatory body view 
these studies as extremely valuable for experience 
feedback. They regard this improved knowledge of 
errors as useful for the development of safety, oper-
ability and control of maintenance as well as for 
prevention of costly maintenance rework or forced 
plant shutdowns. The feedback from discussions of 
the analysis results with plant experts and profes-
sionals has been crucial in developing the ﬁnal 
conclusions and recommendations that meet the 
speciﬁc development needs of remedial actions and 
practises at the plants.
After these studies, analyses of the recent main-
tenance history have continued at one of the plants 
where the error analyses have been performed by 
the plant maintenance development personnel and 
reported in interaction with VTT [Leino & Laakso, 
2005] and are planned for continuation in 2006 at 
the other plant, too.
It must however be admitted that human errors 
are inevitable and cannot be totally eliminated. The 
aim has been to turn negative experiences of “unde-
tected common cause failure events” and recurrent 
errors into so uneventful maintenance and opera-
tion as reasonably practicable. Learning from one’s 
and others’ occurred errors and experiences is the 
best way for the real actors to learn and develop.
32
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